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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Shawn Michael Horn pled guilty to one count of
aggravated assault and one count of burglary.

He received an aggregate unified

sentence of five years, with three years fixed. On appeal, he contends the district court
erred in relinquishing its retained jurisdiction and not placing Mr. Horn back on
probation. He further contends the district court abused its discretion in failing to further
reduce his sentences in light of the additional information submitted in conjunction with
his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. Finally, Mr. Horn contends
that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection when it
refused to augment the record with transcripts requested by Mr. Horn.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Supreme Court Docket No. 39728 (district court case number 2009-19309

(hereinafter, the assault case) and Supreme Court Docket No. 39729 (district court case
number 2011-5974 (hereinafter, the shoplifting case) have been consolidated for
appellate purposes.

(R., p.211.)

As the conduct alleged in the shoplifting case

constituted the gist of the probation violation in the assault case, the district court began
setting the cases together starting at the probation violation and arraignment hearing on
June 3, 2011. (See generally 6/3/11 Tr.)
In the assault case, in the evening of September 11, 2009, Mr. Horn and his
friend, Mr. Herrera, met an acquaintance at a local park for the purpose of exchanging a
backpack that contained some miscellaneous personal items belonging to Mr. Horn.
(PSI, pp.2, 19.) During the process of returning the backpack, Mr. Horn took a swing at

1

the acquaintance. 1

(PSI, p.2.)

This person's two friends were waiting in a nearby

vehicle and upon seeing Mr. Horn attempt to punch their friend, immediately exited the
vehicle, armed with a baseball bat.

(PSI, p.2.) In the ensuing struggle that followed,

Mr. Horn and Mr. Herrera wrested the baseball bat from the bat's owner, after which
they fled. (PSI, p.2.) During the struggle, the owner of the bat said she was afraid if
Mr. Horn and Mr. Herrera were able to get the bat away from her, they would hit her
with it.

(PSI, p.i7.)

Thus the prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Horn with robbery,

which was then amended to aggravated assault. (R, pp.28-29, 42.)
As part of a plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend probation and local
jail (at the discretion of the probation officer).

(1017109 Tr., p.7, Ls.8-20; R, p.42.)

Mr. Horn entered an Alford plea to the aggravated assault charge. (1017109 Tr., p.15,
Ls.17-23.)

At sentencing, the state recommended a sentence of two years fixed,

followed by three years indeterminate. (11/23/09 Tr., p.30, Ls.23-25.) The district court
imposed upon Mr. Horn a five year sentence, with one year fixed, but it suspended the
sentence and put Mr. Horn on probation for three years. (11/23/09 Tr., p.36, Ls.3-7; R,
pp.65-69.)
On January 27, 2010, a report of probation violation was filed which alleged
Mr. Horn had tested positive for cocaine and admitted that he consumed alcohol. (R,
pp.72-73.) Mr. Horn was found to have violated the terms of his probation, and the
district court reinstated Mr. Horn on probation but required him to serve 30 days in jail.
(R., pp.84-86.)

1 Mr. Horn later admitted that the acquaintance told him that he was a sex offender,
which angered Mr. Horn such that he felt he should attempt to punish the acquaintance
for his immoral acts. (PSI, p.3.)
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A second report of probation violation was filed on March 24, 2010, alleging that
Mr. Horn moved without his probation officer's permission. (R., pp.90-91.) The district
court found that Mr. Horn violated his probation. (R., pp.98-107.) On June 3, 2010, the
district court revoked Mr. Horn's probation and retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (R.,
pp.1 07-1 09.)

At the conclusion of Mr. Horn's programming, Idaho Department of

Correction personnel recommended that Mr. Horn be placed on probation. (PSI, p.20.)
The district court placed him back on probation on November 8,2010. (R., pp.114-115;
117-118.)
A third report of probation violation was filed on April 21, 2011, alleging that
Mr. Horn violated the law when he incurred new burglary and grand theft charges;
tested positive for marijuana; and, associated with another individual on felony
probation.

(R., pp.150-151.)

The new charges upon which Mr. Horn's report of

probation violation was based involved shoplifting a television.
In the shoplifting case, Mr. Horn walked into a Wal-Mart store and walked out
carrying a flat screen television on his shoulders. (R., pp.172-173.) The prosecuting
attorney charged Mr. Horn by information with one count of burglary and one count of
grand theft. (R, pp.172-173.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Horn pled guilty to the
burglary and the other charge was dismissed. (6/3/11 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.7.) The
State agreed to recommend a retained jurisdiction in both the shoplifting case and the
probation violation in the assault case.

(6/3/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-7.)

The district court

imposed upon Mr. Horn a five year sentence, with three years fixed. (6/3/11 Tr., p.25,
Ls.5-16; R, pp.184-186.) The district court ordered that the sentences from the assault
case and the shoplifting case be served concurrently. (6/3/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.14-15; R,
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p.182.) The court revoked probation in the assault case and retained jurisdiction in both
cases. (R, pp.182-183.)
The Department of Correction recommended that the district court relinquish
jurisdiction over Mr. Horn.

(PSI, p.28.) The district court held a hearing and heard

testimony by Mr. Horn (and Mr. Horn's fiancee) regarding Mr. Horn's conduct and
participation in the rider program.

(See generally 1/13/12 Tr.; R, pp.189-190.)

Nevertheless, the district court decided to relinquish jurisdiction in both cases. (1/13/12
Tr., p.32, Ls.16-22; R, pp.190-196.) When the court relinquished jurisdiction, it stated
on the record that the sentence in the shoplifting case was "a five-year unified; two fixed
followed by three indeterminate.,,2 (1/13/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.19-21; R, p.190.)
Mr. Horn then filed a timely I.C.R 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence
(hereinafter, Rule 35).

(R, p.197.)

The district court held a hearing, during which

Mr. Horn testified via telephone as to the facts and circumstances surrounding his
current custodial situation.

(4/23/12 Tr., p.6, L.8 - p.11, L.10.)

The district court

granted Mr. Horn's motion in the shoplifting case, in part, and reduced Mr. Horn's
sentence to two years fixed and three years indeterminate. (4/23/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-25;
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R.
35.) However, the district court denied Mr. Horn's Rule 35 motion in the assault case.
(Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R
35.) Mr. Horn appeals from the district court's order of Judgment and Disposition on

2 The district court orally pronounced Mr. Horn's sentence on December 2011, as being
five years, with two years fixed. (1/13/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.19-21; R, p.190.) The judgment
of conviction reflects a sentence of five years, with three years fixed. (R, pp.185, 195.)
Idaho law clearly provides that the oral pronouncement controls; however, Mr. Horn is
not appealing this issue, as the district court remedied the inconsistency in its Order
Granting Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35.
See, e.g., State v. Watts, 131 Idaho 782, 786 (Ct. App. 1998).
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Retained Jurisdiction (the assault case), the district court's order of Judgment and
Disposition on Retained Jurisdiction (the shoplifting case), the district court's Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (the
assault case), and the district court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (the shoplifting case). (R., pp.181186; 191-196.)
On appeal, Mr. Horn filed a motion to augment the appellate record with four
transcripts and three documents.

(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing

Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)
The State objected to Mr. Horn's requests for three of the transcripts, claiming that
Mr. Horn failed to demonstrate that the transcripts were relevant. (Objection In Part to
"Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support
Thereof' (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho
Supreme Court entered an order granting in part and denying in part appellant's Motion
to Augment. (Order, p.1.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted Mr. Horn's motion in part
by ordering the three documents be made a part of the record on appeal, and one of the
three transcripts be prepared and included in the record.

(Order, p.1.)

The Idaho

Supreme Court denied the motion in part by not requiring preparation and inclusion of
the three transcripts objected to by the State. (Order, p.1.)
Mr. Horn contends on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by failing
to place him back on probation after his period of retained jurisdiction and by failing to
further reduce his sentence, in light of the additional information submitted in
conjunction with his Rule 35 motion. Mr. Horn further argues that the Idaho Supreme

5

Court denied him due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the
record with the requested transcripts.
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished its retained
jurisdiction over Mr. Horn?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Horn's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motions?

3.

Was Mr. Horn denied due process and equal protection when the Idaho Supreme
Court denied his requests to augment the record on appeal with several
transcripts?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Horn
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-252'1.

State v,

Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). "The decision to place a defendant on probation or

whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of that discretion."

State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 2010).

Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court reviews
the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original judgment. Id.
at 289.
Mr. Horn contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing
jurisdiction in light of his great success on the first retained jurisdiction, his limited
successes during the second period of retained jurisdiction, his recognition of a
problem, and his desire to change in order to move on to a more successful future.
In the assault case, Mr. Horn's probation was revoked in June of 2010 and the
district court retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.1 07-1 09)

Mr. Horn was placed in the

Department's Correctional Alternative Placement Program (CAPP), and at the
conclusion of the program, Idaho Department of Correction personnel recommended
Mr. Horn be placed on probation. (PSI, p.20.) Mr. Horn's case manager reported that
Mr. Horn attended all of his required sessions, completed his homework as directed,
and made good progress in identifying old core beliefs that have caused him problems
in his life. (PSI, p.22.) His attendance at the various programs was 100%, and he even
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helped newer class members with their assignments.

(PSI, pp.22-23.)

Mr. Horn's

participation in several groups was noted to be excellent or above average. (PSI, p.23.)
Mr. Horn even mentored some of the newer participants. (PSI, p.23.) The district court
placed him back on probation on NovemberS, 2010. (R., pp.114-115; 117-11S.)
Mr. Horn recognizes his second period of retained jurisdiction was not as
successful as the first.

However, he did have some limited successes during the

second period of retained jurisdiction. Mr. Horn worked hard on getting his GED while
on the rider. (PSI, pp.31, 42.) He completed extra credit work and worked hard in his
Writing Skills class, despite his reading and attention problems. (PSI, p.42.) Mr. Horn
did not have any formal disciplinary sanctions while at NICI. (PSI, p.30.) One C-Note
indicated he appeared to be making some progress in the program, but had problems
with "acting out." (PSI, p.37.) Other C-Notes indicated that although Mr. Horn reacted
inappropriately to disappointment, he often apologized for such inappropriate behaviors.
(PSI, pp.39, 42.)
Further, the rider review report also noted Mr. Horn had a history of treatment for
mental illness and had several anxiety attacks while in the program.

(PSI, p.32.)

Mr. Horn's case manager even recommended that Mr. Horn seek a mental evaluation.
(PSI, p.32.)
Mr. Horn's fiancee at the time, Chelsea Eide, testified at his rider review hearing
that Mr. Horn had plans to enroll in college and better his life. (1/13/12 Tr., p.10, L.18p.11, L.2.) Mr. Horn planned to move past his previous gang affiliation and be a family
man with a job, while going to school. (1/13/12 Tr., pp.11-25.) Mr. Horn also addressed
the district court and said he was tired of dealing with his [gang] tattoos and the

9

repercussions of having a former gang affiliation in prison. 3 (1/13/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.9-13.)
Mr. Horn was encouraged by his excellent progress toward completing his GED and
was proud to tell the court he was "book smart." (1/13/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-19.) Mr. Horn
wanted to keep achieving and get more education. (1/13/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.22-25; p.17,
Ls.14-15.) The district court noticed Mr. Horn's determination to reform his life and gave
him several opportunities to rehabilitate himself. (1/13/12 Tr., p.28, L.23 - p.32, L.15.)
Based upon the above information, Mr. Horn contends the district court abused
its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction in his cases.
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court,
which demonstrates Mr. Horn's significant rehabilitative potential, as well as his great
successes while on his first rider, and his limited successes while on his second rider,
the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction in his cases and
when it failed to sua sponte reduce both of Mr. Horn's sentences upon relinquishing
jurisdiction.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Horn's Motion For A
Sentence Reduction In The Assault Case And Failed To Further Reduce Mr. Horn's
Sentence In The Shoplifting Case

A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,

3 In fact, Mr. Horn asserted at his rider review hearing that members of a rival gang
sabotaged his progress on the rider, as much of the rider program involves community
reporting, Le., the inmates writing up other offenders. (1/13/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.17-24; p.20,
Ls.13-17; p.21, Ls.15-18; p.31, Ls.23-25.)
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125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Mr. Horn asserts that his sentences should have been further reduced in light of
the new information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion. Mr. Horn asserts
the district court's denial of his motion for a sentence modification represents an abuse
of discretion.
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Horn testified via telephone
at the Rule 35 hearing and provided the court with information regarding his time in
custody. (See generally 4/23/12 Tr.) Mr. Horn chose to go into protective custody in
order to stay out of trouble due to his previous gang affiliation. (4/23/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.1016.) Mr. Horn desperately wants to change and put his criminal code aside; however,
the programming Mr. Horn needs and desires is not available to him in protective
custody. (4/23/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-15; p.9, Ls.4-10.) Mr. Horn was not aware of this fact
until after he went into protective custody.

(4/23/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.22-25.)

While in

protective custody, Mr. Horn has to be in his cell for 23-24 hours a day; he has been
reading self-help books in an attempt to rehabilitate himself. (4/23/12 Tr., p.6, L.16; p.8,
Ls.19-25.) Notably, he will soon begin a self-initiated anger management book, as his
APSI recommended he take some type of anger management class. (4/23/12 Tr., p.8,
Ls.20-23; PSI, p.35.) He is trying to do whatever he can to better himself. Mr. Horn
stated he "really just want[s] to do good" and he does want to change. (4/23/12 Tr., p.9,
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Ls.5-10; p.10, Ls.19-20.)

Further, Mr. Horn also advised the district court he was

speaking with a psychologist about his depression. (4/23/12 Tr., p.?, Ls.2-10.)
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in
denying Mr. Horn's motion to reduce his sentence in the assault case and in failing to
further reduce Mr. Horn's sentence in the shoplifting case, in response to his Rule 35
motion.
III.

Mr. Horn Was Denied Due Process And Equal Protection When The Idaho Supreme
Court Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Necessary Transcripts
A.

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has held it is a violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent defendant
access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues the defendant
intends to raise on appeal. The only way a state can constitutionally deny an indigent
defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove the transcript is
irrelevant to the appeal.
In this case, Mr. Horn filed a request to augment the record with several
documents and four transcripts of previous hearings in Mr. Horn's cases. The State
objected and this Court granted in part and denied in part Mr. Horn's motion.

On

appeal, Mr. Horn is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denials of his request for the
transcripts of:

(1) the Dispositional Hearing held on February 11, 2010; (2) the

Admit/Deny Hearing held on June 3, 3010; and (3) the Rider Review Hearing held on
November 8, 2010. Mr. Horn asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the
12

district court's discussion at the January 13, 2012 rider review hearing because the
court referred to the statements and recommendations made by the State at the
disposition hearing in February of 2010:
THE COURT:
Within a couple of months, by January of 2010, within two
months, you'd violated that probation by the use of alcohol and the use of
cocaine. The state at that point said, "Well, that's a pretty serious probation
violation to be drinking and using cocaine. We should use a rider." I reinstated
you on probation and put you back out, even though that was a serious probation
violation in February of 2010.

(1/13/12 Tr., p.29, Ls.2-11.)
The district court then referred to the next probation violation and the
explanations of Mr. Horn, although it did not identify when Mr. Horn made the
statements the court was referencing:
THE COURT:
One month later, you're back before the Court on a
probation violation where I deemed that the state had proved you had moved
without permission of your probation officer and they lost contact with you. You
had some explanations about that, and I accepted those explanations ... At that
point, the Department of Corrections said, "Don't fool around anymore. Send him
to the penitentiary. Just give him a term sentence."

(1113/12 Tr., p.29, L.12-p.30, L.1.)
The district court next discussed Mr. Horn's exemplary performance on his CAPP
rider, which was most likely based on a discussion at Mr. Horn's rider review hearing
held on November 8, 2010:
THE COURT:
I did not. I used the rider in June of 2010. And you did a
good job on that rider. You came back with a good - it was a CAPP rider. You
came back with a good CAPP rider report. And based on that report, we placed
you on a new two-year period of supervised probation. All the changes that
you've talked about and all the changes that I was hoping to see - but you more
than anybody wanted to see, not just what I want - all the changes looked like
they might be in place for you and maybe things were going to change around for
you, and I'm still hopeful that that's the case.

(1/13/12 Tr., p.30, Ls.2-15.)
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Although Mr. Horn cannot point to a place where the district court looked at a
transcript of either the dispositional hearing, the admit/deny hearing, or the rider review
hearing, it appears that the court was either relying on its memory of those hearings, or
on notes it had taken during the previous proceedings, when it relinquished jurisdiction
on January 13, 2012. Appellate counsel for Mr. Horn was not present at these hearing,
and has no transcripts to reference, and thereby is severely disadvantaged in being
unable to refer to, or even review, those proceedings in preparing an appellate brief for
Mr. Horn. Where it is clear the district court based its decision on what had transpired in
these previous hearings, it is fundamentally unfair to refuse to permit Mr. Horn to access
a transcript of the proceedings. While the court's memory or notes cannot be made a
part of the record on appeal, these transcripts can, and should, be provided to Mr. Horn
so he can reference the circumstances surrounding the court's decision to relinquish
jurisdiction and not reinstate Mr. Horn on probation.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme

Court denied Mr. Horn due process and equal protection by denying his request for
these three transcripts.

B.

Standard of Review
The Court exercises free review in determining whether the constitutional

requirements of due process have been satisfied. State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296 (Ct.
App.2003).
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C.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Horn Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The
Requested Transcripts
The Constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a

criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art.
I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State

V.

Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State

V.

Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh

V.

State, 132

Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant has a statutory right to appeal. See I.C. § 19-2801.
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, such transcript
must be created at county expense.
rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the production of

transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further,

"[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... " Id.
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be
prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
15

The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record, including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that in order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due
process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record
which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review); see also Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1959) ("[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal
cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure
because of their poverty.") However, the second theme limits the states' obligation-the
states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of
the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. See State v. Draper, 372 U.S.
487 (1963) (,,[P]art or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be
germane to consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its
funds unnecessarily in such circumstances."); see also Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404
U.S. 189 (1971) (holding that a defendant need only make a colorable argument that
he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal; then it becomes the State's
burden to prove that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal).
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.
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Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
Here, the requested items fall within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review.
The transcripts of these three hearings are relevant because Idaho appellate courts
review all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court
appropriately revoked probation.

See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App.

2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation
of probation.") (emphasis added).4
As set forth in appellant's Motion to Augment, Mr. Horn requested several items
necessary to provide an adequate record on appeal.

The substance of the three

hearings is not known to appellate counsel, as the minutes provided in the record are
only incomplete notes as to what transpired.

(See R., pp.83-85; 98-105; 114-115.)

However, the district court, prior to relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Horn, made
reference to all three hearings for which Mr. Horn requested transcripts.

(1/13/12 Tr.,

p.29, L.2 - p.30, L.15.)
Any statements made by the district court regarding evidence and testimony it
considered in determining whether to relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Horn is relevant to

4But see State v. Morgan, Docket No. 39057, 2012 Op. No. 38 pA, (Ct. App. 2012) (not
yet final) (holding that not "all proceedings in the trial court up to and including
sentencing are germane. The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial
court's decision to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are
properly made part of the record on appeal.").
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his appeal. Without access to the requested transcripts, Mr. Horn is unable to address
on appeal whether the district court erred in relinquishing its jurisdiction over Mr. Horn.
In sum, the decision to deny Mr. Horn's request for the transcripts will render his
appeal meaningless, because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts support
the district court's sentencing decisions.

This functions as a procedural bar to the

review of Mr. Horn's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, Mr. Horn
should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the presumption should not
be applied.

D.

By Failing To Provide Mr. Horn With Access To The Requested Transcripts, The
Court Has Denied Him The Opportunity To Receive Effective Assistance Of
Counsel On Appeal.
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel

in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated and made applicable
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme

Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due
process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell v.

Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants
counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of Douglas
was clarified as being the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
According to the United States Supreme Court, if counsel is to be effective,
appellate counsel must make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in
18

support of the best arguments to be made. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967), held that the constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process
"can only be attained where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client ..
. . [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he support his client's interest's to the best
of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860,865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this
case, the lack of access to the requested transcripts has prevented appellate counsel
from making a conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented
appellate counsel from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise, or
whether there is factual support in favor of any argument made or undercutting an
argument.

Therefore, Mr. Horn has not obtained full review of the trial proceedings

based on the merits and has been deprived of an opportunity to receive effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate counsel neither
can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal,
nor can appellate counsel consider all issues that might affect the district court's
decision to relinquish its jurisdiction over Mr. Horn. Counsel is also unable to advise
Mr. Horn on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested
transcripts and should

be allowed the opportunity to

provide any necessary

supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Horn respectfully requests this Court further reduce his sentences as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion
be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 9 th day of November, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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